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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY STATED THE 
LAW PERTAINING TO THE EXISTENCE OF LEGAL DUTIES 
AND CONTRACT FORMATION. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that "[w]hether a contract to procure insurance or a 
duty to procure a policy of insurance ultimately exists, are questions of fact best left to the 
trier of fact.,, Harris v. Albrecht. 2002 UT App 98,1f 29, n.6, 46 P.3d 241. Even Harris 
admits in his brief that this statement is ''unfortunately-worded,'' (Harris' Brief, p. 17) and 
concedes that "where the operative facts [are] not in dispute" the determination of 
whether a contract or duty exists is a "pure question of law." (Harris' Brief, pp. 17, 35 
n.12.) 
However, Harris nonetheless believes the decision of the Court of Appeals should be 
affirmed, claiming the existence of disputed "operative facts." As explained below, no 
such dispute exists for purposes of summary judgment. 
II. NO UNDERLYING OR SUBSIDIARY FACTUAL QUESTIONS 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
There are no questions of material fact that would preclude the making of a legal 
decision as to whether a duty or contract to procure exists in this case. It is true that in 
some instances a jury may have to resolve disputed "subsidiary issues of fact" before a 
court can make the ultimate legal determination regarding the existence of a contract or 
legal duty. See O'Hara v. Hall. 628 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1981). According to Harris, the 
1 
following "underlying factual question" precludes summary judgment in the present case: 
Harris maintains that he instructed Albrecht to procure insurance for his business, 
and that Albrecht agreed. See R. at 330. Albrecht denies that Harris ever gave 
such an instruction, and denies that he ever agreed. See Brief of Appellants, at 
7. This is a classic factual dispute. Until this factual dispute is decided, no court 
(whether the district court, court of appeals or this Court) can decide the 
overarching legal issues regarding the existence of a duty.. J 
(Harris' Brief, pp. 22, 35 n.12) (emphasis added.) Thus Harris contends summary 
judgment is inappropriate. 
However, the "classic factual dispute" over the alleged phone conversation was not an 
issue for purposes of summary judgment. Albrecht2 conceded the issue for purposes of 
the motion. R. 216 fll 19). This was acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in footnote 3 
of its decision: "Albrecht denies making such statement. However, Albrecht argues that 
!
- Strangely, after asserting that the existence of duty could not be decided until the 
factual issue was resolved, Harris asserts that the Court of Appeals did decide implicitly 
that a duty existed: 
the court of appeals in essence decided (without explicitly saying so), that, 
based on the facts as alleged by Harris, Albrecht did have a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in the procurement of insurance, but that final 
determination of the legal question would have to await the factfinder's 
resolution of the underlying factual dispute. This determination was 
correct. 
(Harris' Brief, p. 22 n. 7) (emphasis in original). However, Harris' characterization is 
inaccurate. The Court of Appeals very clearly stated that "we do not decide today that a 
contract or a duty exists." Harris, 2002 UT App 98,1f29 n.6, 46 P.3d 241. Therefore, 
contrary to Harris' contention, the Court of Appeals did not implicitly find that a duty 
existed. 
2
 Just as in the opening brief, "Albrecht" will refer to all the appellants collectively. 
2 
even if he did make such a statement, it neither established a contract to procure 
insurance nor a duty to procure insurance" Harris, 2002 UT App 98, \ 4 n.3, 46 P.3d 
241 (emphasis added).3 Likewise, Justice Davis in his dissent expressly acknowledged 
the absence of any dispute over this fact (for summary judgment purposes) stating that the 
motion was "based on a given set of facts." Id at If 31 (Davis, J., dissenting).4 Further, 
the argument of whether the terms and circumstances are too indefinite to give rise to 
legal obligations implies that the facts are being challenged only as to their legal 
sufficiency. 
As long as it is assumed for purposes of argument that the alleged conversation did 
take place, it is appropriate for a court to decide the ''overarching legal issues regarding 
3
 At the trial court level and before the Court of Appeals Albrecht disputed making 
the statement, but for purposes of summary judgment asked that it be assumed the 
statement was made. 
4
 The majority of the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was precluded 
because the jury needed to consider four particular facts. Id at J^ 27. However, the four 
facts referred to were either expressly or implicitly undisputed and/or immaterial for 
purposes of summary judgment. First, Albrecht did not dispute for purposes of summary 
judgment that he and Harris had an on-going, eight-year, relationship. As noted by 
Albrecht in the record, Harris had purchased policies through Albrecht including 
automobile policies, a homeowner's policy, boat insurance, R.V. insurance, and a liability 
policy. R. 427. Second, Albrecht did not dispute for purposes of summary judgment that 
the parties regularK conducted business over the phone. R. 424. Third, and related to the 
second, Albrecht did not dispute for purposes of summary judgment that Harris rarely 
discussed with Albrecht the particulars of insurance coverage sought by Harris. Id. 
Fourth, Albrecht did not dispute, for purposes of summary judgment, the assertion that 
Harris told Albrecht that he wanted to place business coverage on his office and its 
contents and, in response, that Albrecht replied he would take care of it and that he would 
come out and look at the equipment. R. 216 fl| 19). 
3 
the existence of a duty." (Harris' Brief, p. 22.) Therefore, there are no factual questions 
precluding summary judgment. 
A somewhat similar scenario arose in the case of Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 443 
N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1989), where the plaintiff sued an insurance agent for failing to cover 
a boat under a homeowner's policy. A factual dispute existed, but the defendant, "for the 
purposes of the motion for summary judgment. . . accepted Lacanne's version of the facts 
. . . " Id at 543. The trial court granted summary judgment holding there was no duty 
even under the plaintiffs version of the facts. The court of appeals reversed stating that 
the jury should determine whether the facts and circumstances of the case gave rise to a 
duty. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the court of appeals was reversed on 
the following basis: 
The court of appeals held that his case should go to the jury for a determination of 
whether the facts and circumstances of the case give rise to a duty of care owed by 
Warnemundc to LaCanne. This is erroneous. The existence of a legal duty is a 
question for the court, not the jury. . . . The existence of a legal duty depends on 
the factual circumstances of each case. It is not, however, the jury's function to 
determine whether the facts give rise to a duty. 
Id. at n.l. The court then reversed the court of appeals, stating that "[ujnder the present 
facts, the trial court was correct in concluding that no duty existed." IcL at 545. 
Like Gabrielson, Albrecht conceded the facts for purposes of summary judgment, and 
it therefore was the duty of the Court of Appeals to determine whether a duty or contract 
existed based on that given set of facts. As stated in Gabrielson, wtit is not. . . the jury's 
4 
function to determine whether the facts give rise to a duty." Id 
III. THERE WAS NO SOURCE FROM WHICH THE TERMS OF A 
POLICY FOR HARRIS' BUSINESS, NOR THE CONTENTS 
THEREOF, COULD HAVE BEEN IMPLIED - THEREFORE, 
NO CONTRACT TO PROCURE WAS CREATED. 
The important rule of law stated in the cases cited by Harris in his brief is that in 
order to form a valid contract to procure insurance, all of the essential terms of the 
ultimate insurance contract must at least be capable of being implied from other sources 
or circumstances. See Hamachcr v. Tumy. 352 P.2d 493, 497 (Or. 1960). Despite 
Harris' contentions, there was no source from which the terms of a policy for Harris1 
business, nor the contents thereof, could have been implied. Therefore, no contract to 
procure was created. 
A) Harris' Argument of Implying Terms and Contents from a "Standard 
Policy".or Sales Brochure Is Flawed. 
Contrary to Harris' contention, there was no basis for Albrecht to imply from a 
brochure or "standard policy"' what Harris' contents may have been, or what options, 
coverages, limits, etc. Harris would have desired. Although Harris points out that 
Albrecht referred to a "standard policy" in the briefing below (Hams' Brief, p. 44 n.16), 
there is no such thing as a "standard policy" in the sense used by Harris. R. 159 (pp. 33, 
35,51-52, 83-84). There are certain automatic coverages included in a policy once 
contents have been identified, and options, limits, deductibles, other coverages, etc. have 
been decided by the prospective insured. R. 159 (pp. 17, 61, 143); R. 365-362. However, 
5 
there is no "standard policy" that could be defaulted to without certain crucial information 
from the prospective insured, e.g., contents, etc. R. 159 (pp. 33. 35, 51-52, 83-84). 
It is not difficult to illustrate why implying contents or terms from a brochure or 
"standard policy" would not have been possible in this case. For instance, if Albrecht 
were to "cut and paste" the automatic coverages from the sales brochure as Harris argues, 
Harris would have received $5,000 in valuable papers coverage.^ R. 159 (pp. 17, 61, 
143); R. 365-362. Harris claims $940,000 for lost valuable papers, not $5,000. R. 205, 
390. Thus, an agent is clearly not justified in speculating as to a prospective insured's 
property or insurance needs, as argued by Harris. 
B) Harris' Argument Regarding the Parties' Prior Dealings is Flawed. 
Harris argues that in the past, Albrecht had always been able to procure automobile or 
similar policies with limited information, and therefore Albrecht should have done so on 
Harris' business. However, in their prior dealings, Harris at least identified for Albrecht 
the object or objects to be insured. For instance, Harris states: "[a]s it worked, Harris 
would call Albrecht, tell him, for instance, what type of car he wanted to add, and 
Albrecht would place the coverage." (Harris' Brief, p. 32) (emphasis added.) Unlike 
this, Harris never told Albrecht what the contents of his business were. 
Further, Harris never before had a business policy, and because Albrecht had no 
knowledge of the contents of Harris' business nor of the terms Harris may have desired, 
5
 Assuming State Farm would have been willing to insure Harris. 
6 
R. 186 (pp. 107-09), there was no source from which to imply the contents or terms of a 
policy. 
C) The Cases Cited by Harris Regarding Contracts to Procure Insurance 
Are Either Inapposite, Or, Actually Support Albrechfs Position. 
The cases cited by Harris regarding contracts to procure insurance are either 
inapposite, or, actual support Albrechf s position. For instance, Harris cites Lakeview 
Farms, Inc.. v. Patten, 640 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) in support of his case. 
However, in Lakeview, just like Albrecht presently argues, the court held that the alleged 
contract to procure insurance was insufficiently definite to be enforced. Because there 
was no course of dealing from which to infer the essential terms, a verdict for the plaintiff 
was reversed. Thus, Lakeview entirely supports Albrechf s position, not Harris'. Further. 
Lakeview does not involve an insurance agent situation. Lakeview involved an 
employer's promise to procure medical insurance for an employee. 
Harris also cites the case of Hamacher v. Tumv, 352 P.2d 493 (Or. 1960), wherein a 
prospective insured brought an action against certain insurance agents ("agents") for their 
alleged failure to procure insurance on buildings owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was 
an owner of a saw and planing mill that were already insured. The policy limited the 
insurance company's liability for claims to 90% of the actual cash value of the property at 
the time of a loss, up to $170,000. The plaintiff subsequently made substantial 
improvements to the mill. An appraisal showed the property value had increased to 
7 
$226,000.00. The plaintiff made even more improvements after the appraisal, increasing 
the property value further. Consequently, the plaintiff and one of the agents met to 
discuss the possibility of increasing the amount of insurance for the mill. The agent 
suggested the insurance be increased to 95% of the current insurable value of the mill. 
The plaintiff decided he would do that. The plaintiff provided the agent with a written 
appraisal report for the mill and the agent took the report to his office to determine the 
total insurable value of the mill. Before the agent could return to discuss the insurance 
value, a fire damaged plaintiffs mills to the extent of $174,166.58. At the time of the 
fire, the defendants had not procured additional insurance and the plaintiff recovered only 
$139,396.29. The plaintiff sued the agents for the remaining uncovered amounts and was 
defeated at the trial court level. 
On appeal, the court recognized the rule that, before a party can have a duty to procure 
insurance, there must be an agreement on all the essential elements of the contract to be 
procured: 
[w]here a person seeks to enter into a contract of insurance with an insurance 
company or its agent it is understood that the negotiations will not ripen into a 
contract until the parties arrive at an agreement as to all the elements which 
are essential to an insurance contract, including the subject matter to be 
covered, the risk insured against, the amount of indemnity, the duration of 
the coverage and the premium. 
Hamaeher, 352 P.2d at 349 (emphasis added). The court also stated that, absent sufficient 
information from the insured to enable the agent to obtain the insurance, no liability for 
failure to procure can attach: 
8 
Obviously, liability for failure to procure insurance could not arise unless the agent 
had sufficiently definite directions from his principal to consummate the final 
insurance contract. 
Id 
The trial court in Hamacher was reversed and the case was remanded based largely on 
the trial court's instruction to the jury that a contract to procure insurance must be proven 
with the same certainty as a contract of insurance. Id. at 496. Since the plaintiff and 
defendants had insured the mills under a prior policy, the court held that, in that instance, 
a jury might use that prior course of dealing to ascertain the essential elements of the 
insurance to be procured. Specifically, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that: 
[t]he principal vice of the instruction is that it could be considered by the members 
of the jury as prohibiting them from finding a contract to procure insurance from 
the facts short of an express agreement to that effect. There were facts from 
which a contract to procure insurance could reasonably be implied. As we 
have already indicated, at the time of the negotiations in question there were 
in existence several policies of insurance on the buildings and equipment on 
the plaintiffs plant site. These policies were executed only after the 
defendants had discussed with plaintiff at some length his fire insurance 
program, and the terms of the policies embodied the original program upon 
which the parties had reached agreement. The previous coverage is relevant 
in the present case. From the fact that the parties had agreed upon a five year 
term as the duration of the coverage under the policies already in force, it 
would be reasonable to infer that the additional coverage was to be for the 
same term. 
Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added, quoting Patterson, Principles of Insurance Law (2nd Ed.) p. 
88). Thus, in Hamacher, the Court held that a contract to procure could exist absent an 
express agreement so long as the essential terms could be implied from "policies already 
9 
in force." Hamacher, 352 P.2d at 497-98. 
Applying Hamacher to this case, Harris cannot prevail because, as already explained, 
there was no prior course of dealing for business insurance from which the essential terms 
could be implied. 
The other cases cited by Harris are like Hamacher, in that they acknowledge the 
general rule requiring agreement on all essential contract terms, at least by implication. 
See Bulla v. Donahue, 366 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Ind. App. 1977) (holding that the "terms and 
conditions of the proposed policy need to be sufficiently definite to enable the agent or 
broker to procure a policy consistent with the applicant's insurance needs'*); Marshel 
In\cstments. Inc. v. Cohen, 634 P.2d 133, 141 (Kan. App. 1981) ("we do not question the 
general rule that to prove the existence of an agreement there must be evidence of 
reasonable definiteness that there was a meeting of the parties' minds upon subject matter 
and terms. . . ."); Olvera v. Charles Z. Flack Agency, Inc., 415 S.E.2d 760, 762 (N.C. 
App. 1992) ("determining whether an agent has undertaken to procure a policy of 
insurance, a court must look to the conduct of the parties and the communications 
between them"); Rena, Inc. v. T.W. Brien, Underwriters, 708 A.2d 747 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
App. Div. 1998) (if no express agreement, terms must at least be found by implication). 
In Bulla, the plaintiffs sued an insurance agent for failing to obtain automobile 
coverage. One of the plaintiffs went to her agent's office with her current policy and 
10 
informed the agent she wanted the same coverages. The agent then placed a call to 
another agent in order to obtain lower premiums and the second agent was given five 
pages containing the plaintiffs' prior insurance information. The plaintiffs also executed 
a check for the premium and sent the check and the information to the second agent. 
Upon receipt of the information and the check, the second agent decided he did not want 
the business and he failed to submit the information to an insurance company. However, 
he did not inform either the first agent nor the plaintiffs that coverage would not be 
placed through him. Soon afterward, one of the plaintiffs' automobiles was involved in 
an accident. 
The court held the second insurance agent liable for failure to procure an insurance 
policy and found the insured had given the second agent sufficient information to enable 
him to obtain a policy. Specifically, the court found the insured had provided the agent 
with a list of the desired coverages, deductibles desired, automobiles to be insured, 
drivers of the vehicles, and liens on the vehicles. In short, unlike the instant case, the 
court found the list contained all of the information necessary for the second agent to 
obtain a policy of insurance, as well as a premium payment. 
In Marshel Investments, another case cited by Harris, an oil and gas leasehold owner 
whose well burned in a fire brought an action against an insurance agent for failure to 
procure "above-ground equipment" coverage for his well. The agent had asked the 
plaintiff for a detailed description of the plaintiffs equipment. In response, the plaintiff 
11 
claimed he obtained the descriptions from an employee and then provided the 
descriptions to the insurance agent, thus giving the agent the information needed to secure 
the policy. See id. at 135. 
In Rena, Inc., which arose out of a fire at a bar and restaurant, an owner of the 
property brought an action against an insurance broker for failing to name it as an 
additional insured on an insurance policy purchased by the lessee of the property. The 
case involved the issue of whether an insurance agent had a duty to third persons, other 
than direct clients, in certain circumstances. Rena stands for the proposition that an agent 
may have a duty to persons other than the client who may reasonably expect to be covered 
under an insurance policy. 
A review of Rena reveals the court did not address issues similar to those currently 
before the court in the present case. The Rena court did not address the issue of what 
information an insurance agent would need in order to procure an insurance policy. 
However, the Rena court did state that an agent would have to have information sufficient 
to procure insurance for the "risks indicated." This tangential treatment of the issue 
before the Court indicates that an insured would have to specifically indicate the risks 
sought to be covered before the agent could reasonably be expected to procure the 
insurance. 
In Oivera, a coverage dispute arose after a home was destroyed by a fire. The home 
was originally purchased by Willie Little, who purchased a homeowners policy for the 
12 
residence through Agency, an insurance broker. The homeowner then conveyed the home 
to his mother and sister, who in turn sold it to the plaintiff. Five months after the plaintiff 
purchased the home, a bill for the insurance policy arrived in the mail addressed to Little. 
The plaintiff took the bill to Agency and told a receptionist that she wanted to pay the bill 
and have the same insurance coverage switched over to her name. The receptionist took 
payment for the insurance coverage and informed the plaintiff coverage would be in 
effect for a year. Soon afterward the house was destroyed by a fire. After suit was filed, 
the trial court granted Agency's directed verdict motion. On appeal, the court found the 
plaintiff told Agency she wanted the same coverage that was already in place and she paid 
the premium for the coverage. Under those facts, the court found all of the necessary 
terms of a policy could be inferred. 
In contrast to these cases cited b> Harris, there was no basis for Albrecht to imply 
from any source the terms of a policy nor the contents for Harris' business. Albrecht had 
no knowledge of the contents of Harris' business nor his alleged extensive upgrades, (R. 
186 (pp. 107-09)), and Harris had never before insured the business. Without any prior 
business policies or other source of information regarding Harris' business, Harris' 
alleged phone conversation with Albrecht was, at best, an unenforceable agreement to 
agree. See Homestead Golf Club. Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 
2000) (parties consummated ''[an] agreement to agree, which was wunenforceable because 
[it] leaves open material terms for future consideration, and the courts cannot create these 
13 
terms for the parties'"). Justice Davis was correct in pointing out that the parties' actions 
were preliminary, or, "amounted to little more than an inquiry about insurance." Harris, 
2002 UT App 98, % 39, 46 P.3d 241. 
D) Damages are Speculative, 
It is speculative to decide now what amount of insurance Harris would have ultimately 
purchased or qualified for, especially in the area of valuable papers. In that respect, the 
present case is similar to the case of Wagner v. Falbe, 74 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1956), where 
the court held that the parties had not agreed on the amount of insurance to be purchased: 
the amount of damages recoverable . . . of course depend on the terms of the order 
which the insurance agent undertook to fulfil. In the case at bar, how much 
insurance did Wagner order and Schmitz agree to obtain? . . .[U]ntil it is known 
how much insurance the agent was to obtain she cannot establish in what amount 
her husband was damaged because he obtained none . . . 
Id. at 744 (emphasis in original). The court concluded that "[i]t was useless, then, to 
submit appellant's case to the jury and the nonsuit was properly directed." Id. 
Similarly, the expectation damages in the case at hand would be unascertainable by 
the jury because even according to Harris, the contents of the business and policy terms 
were never discussed. R. 186 (pp. 107-09). 
V. NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO PROCURE - HARRIS' ARGUMENT 
THAT ALBRECHT NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO NOTIFY HARRIS 
OF THE NEED FOR "ADDITIONAL INFORMATION" FAILS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Harris argues that Albrecht, as part of his duty to procure, had a duty to notify Harris 
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that "additional information" was needed before a business policy could be written. 
Harris states: 
if Albrecht had said, cKen, I'd love to insure your business but I can't until I have 
some additional information,' Albrecht would likely have protected himself from 
liability because Harris would have known that no policy would or could yet issue. 
(Harris' Brief, p. 28 n.l 1.) However, this argument fails for the following reasons. 
A) Albrecht Had Not Yet Assumed a Duty to Procure. 
There is authority that the tort duty to procure insurance arises from the contract to 
procure.6 See Couch on Insurance §§ 46:49, p. 46-70, 71, 72; 46:65, p. 46-96 (3d ed. 
1997); Johnson v. George Tenuta & Co.. 185 S.E.2d 732, 736 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972); Bank 
of French Board Inc. v. Brvan. 83 S.E.2d 485 (N.C, 1954); Sanchez v. Martinez. 653 P.2d 
897, 901 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).7 No contract to procure was formed in this case, and 
therefore there could be no negligent failure to perform any contractual duties. 
At a minimum, as even Harris concedes, the request for insurance must be clear and 
specific in order to trigger a duty to procure insurance. See Small v. King, 915 P.2d 
6
 Harris attacks this concept, which is curious (and instructive) since he claims to 
be confident that all of the elements of a contract to procure are present in this case. 
(Harris Brief, p. 20 n. 6.) 
7
 Harris suggests that these authorities are too old, just dicta, and, in any event only 
stand for the proposition that a contract to procure is a sufficient, but not a necessary 
condition for creating a duty to procure sounding in tort. (Harris' Brief, p. 21 n. 6). 
However, Albrecht does not cite these cases as mandatory authority, just as persuasive. 
Further, it can be fairly inferred from the authorities cited that the duty to procure is 
derivative of the contract to procure. 
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1192, 1194 (Wyo. 1996); (Harris' Brief, p. 19) (instructions must be "clear, explicit, 
absolute, and unqualified"). Here, the alleged phone conversation was short, vague, and 
contemplated further negotiations as Albrecht would be coming out to look at the 
equipment. Thus, no duty to procure had yet been assumed by Albrecht. 
B) Albrecht Did Notify Harris That Additional Information Was Needed. 
Even if Albrecht did have a duty to notify Harris that additional information was 
needed, there can be no doubt that Albrecht did so inform Harris. Even according to 
Harris' alleged phone conversation, Albrecht told Harris that he would come see the 
"equipment," "office," and "stuff." R. 186 (pp. 117-121). Because this inspection never 
took place (Harris' Brief, p. 30) (R. 186 (p. 123)), Harris had or should have had an 
absolute knowledge that no policy had been issued. 
C) Whether Albrecht's Actions Warranted an Assumption by Harris That He 
Was Properly Insured Is a Question of Law under the Circumstances of this 
Case. 
The third element of a negligent failure to procure claim requires that "the agent's 
actions warranted an assumption by the client that he was properly insured." Harris v. 
Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, f 11, 46 P.3d 241. Citing to several Utah cases which hold 
that the issue of "reasonable reliance" is a question of fact, Harris claims that a jury 
should be allowed to decide whether he was warranted in assuming that he was properly 
insured. 
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However, where there is clearly no reasonable reliance, the issue of''reasonable 
reliance" can be decided as a matter of law. See Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 
1060, 1067 (Utah 1996) (in a misrepresentation case, the court stated that no matter how 
naive or inexperienced, a person or entity cannot continue to heedlessly accept a 
representation in the face of subsequent contrary writings). 
Albrecht's alleged actions in this case clearly did not warrant an assumption that 
Harris was properly insured. Approximately, five months after the alleged conversation 
(R. 186 (p. 107)); R. 7), Harris admits he still had not received a policy or bill from 
Albrecht, nor had Albrecht come to visit the office to look at the equipment, and no 
premium had ever been paid. See Harris. 2002 UT App 98, €f 38, 46 P.3d 241 (Davis, J., 
dissenting); R. 186 (pp. 117-121). Thus. Justice Davis was correct in his dissent by 
stating that the third element of a negligent failure to procure claim was not met as a 
matter of law. See Harris. 2002 UT App 98,1j 38, 46 P.3d 241 (Davis. J., dissenting). 
D) The Cases Cited by Harris Regarding Duty to Procure Insurance Are 
Either Inapposite, Or, Actually Support Albrecht's Position. 
The cases cited by Harris regarding duty to procure insurance are either inapposite,8 
8
 The case of Industrial Development Associations v. F.T.P.. 591 A.2d 682 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 1991) cited by Harris is entirely inapposite to the issue of when an agent's duty 
to procure is triggered. In that case, an excess insurance broker was inspecting the 
premises and discovered that the sprinkler system was inoperative. The broker did not 
tell anyone. The case revolved around whether the broker had a duty to inform the other 
parties and insurers that the system was inoperative. IcL 472. The case has nothing to do 
with whether a prospective insured's conversation with an agent was legally sufficient to 
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or, actually support Albrechf s position. Many of Harris' cases involve situations where 
the insured has already given specific directions to the agent as to what should be insured, 
and the agent subsequently fails to obtain the insurance, or, mistakenly obtains inadequate 
or incorrect coverage. For instance, in Black v. Illinois Fair Plan Association. 409 N.E.2d 
549 (111. Ct. App. 1980), but unlike the case at hand, the insured gave the agent all the 
information needed to procure a fire insurance policy for his new parcel of real property 
and a policy was procured, except the agent mistakenly wrote the wrong address on the 
application, causing the wrong property to be insured. This is different from the case at 
hand in that Harris never told Albrecht what the contents of his business were. 
In Shapiro v. Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank, 283 111. App. 243 (1935), another 
case cited by Harris, an existing policy was at issue. The buildings to be insured were 
specifically identified, a policy was delivered to the insured, and premiums were paid. 
trigger a duty on the part of the agent to procure insurance. 
Harris also cites Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 443 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1989), 
which is also inapposite to this case because Gabrielson dealt with what constitutes 
"special circumstances" as would increase the scope of the agenf s duty of care. 
Incidentally, however, Gabrielson involves an existing policy. Also, the court held that 
"long acquaintance," several consecutive years of procuring and maintaining the same 
homeowners policy, the agent's admission that it was the agent's own "responsibility," 
the fact that "most insureds are unfamiliar with their policies and rely on their agents," 
were not "special circumstances" such as would expand the duty of care on the agent. Id. 
at 544-46. Finally, as mentioned earlier in this brief, this case confirms that whether an 
insurance agent owes a particular duty is a question of law, not fact. 
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The policy contained an unfortunate exclusion which the insured did not know about. 
When the property was damaged by fire, the exclusion precluded recovery under the 
policy. 
The insured brought suit arguing that the agent knew the exclusion essentially gutted 
the insured's policy based on the insured's circumstances. In response, the insurer argued 
that the insured should have read the policy and would have noticed the exclusion. The 
court held that the insurer cannot avoid liability by saying that the insured could have 
discovered by reading the policy that the insurance issued was not the insurance 
requested. 
In Mets Donuts, Inc. v. Dairvland Insurance Company, 166 A.D.2d 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1990), the facts again involved an existing policy of insurance. The insured lessee of the 
premises made a specific request for $75,000 in contents coverage and $10,000 for lost-
income coverage. A policy was procured but the agent apparently made an error, and 
procured $75,000 in premises coverage and $10,000 in contents coverage. The case has 
nothing to do with whether a prospective insured's conversation with an agent was 
sufficient to trigger a legal duty on the agent's part. Mets Donuts is a case regarding the 
liability of an agent for securing the wrong terms of coverage, and thus is a "breach of 
duty" case, not an "existence of duty" case. 
In the case of Fleetwood Motors, Inc. v. John F. James & Sons, Inc., 237 N.Y.S.2d 
668 (1963) cited by Harris, the prospective insured (car dealer) had made a specific 
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request for auto theft insurance to an insurance broker. The broker took the order and 
submitted a written application to Aetna (and had oral conversations with other insurers). 
None of them wanted to insure the dealer. However, the broker forgot to notify the 
insured of that fact until after several cars had been stolen. 
The dealer sued the broker for failure to procure insurance. The broker offered 
evidence of a letter that was purportedly sent informing the dealer that no insurer would 
underwrite his property. However, the court found that the letter had been backdated and 
was written after the loss occurred. 
Thus, Fleetwood is a case where a broker had all the information he needed and had 
already made a written attempt to place the insurance with an underwriter. The broker 
apparently failed to tell the dealer that his business was not wanted. This is entirely 
different from the present case where it is undisputed that Harris had not yet conveyed the 
information regarding Harris' business. 
All of the other cases cited by Harris on the duty to procure insurance are likewise 
distinguishable, mostly involving existing policies. See Bonner v. Bank of Coushatta, 
445 So. 2d 84 (Ta. Ct. App. 1984) (life insurance agreement already in place, with 
premiums being paid); Lee v. Andrews, 667 P.2d 919 (Mont. 1983) (agent failed to 
procure the automobile coverage after admittedly being given all the information needed 
to procure the policy); Sanchez v. Martinez, 653 P.2d 897 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (agent 
failed to renew a pre-existing homeowners' policy); Bayly, Martin & Fay. Inc v. Pete's 
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Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1987) (though the insurance agent had knowledge that 
the insured requested and required liquor liability insurance to be included in the 
insurance purchased for each of his restaurants, and though the agent had included liquor 
liability coverage in each restaurant policy obtained for the insured previously, the agent 
nonetheless failed to include it in the insurance policy for the most recent restaurant); 
South West Auto Painting and Bodv Repair, Inc. v. Binsfeld, 904 P.2d 1268 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1995) (involving a particular coverage which was not included in the policy 
obtained for the insured); Precision Castparts Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Oregon, 
Inc., 607 P.2d 763 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (the insured specifically requested his policy 
include workers compensation coverage that limited any single loss to $25,000. but the 
agent failed to include this coverage in the policy procured); R.H. Grover, Inc. v. Flynn 
Ins. Co., 777 P.2d 338, 341 (Mont. 1989) (cursory treatment of issue, and court found "it 
is impossible to imply that Flynn [the defendant] had a 'duty' to procure insurance under 
these facts," and consequently held that the trial court had erred by submitting the "failure 
to procure" claim to the jury). 
In summary, unlike the case at hand, the cases cited by Harris stand for the proposition 
that once the essential terms of the ultimate contract of insurance have been agreed to, if 
the agent then fails to execute a policy pursuant to that agreement, he can be negligent for 
the failure to procure, or for failing to notify the prospective insured that no one was 
willing to underwrite the specified property. 
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In the present case, where there was never an agreement as to what was being 
procured, and where the alleged conversation left the details for future ascertainment, 
Albrecht was not under a duty toward Harris. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue that went before the trial court was purely a legal one, which asked 
whether, based on the facts as alleged by Harris, Albrecht had a duty or contract to 
procure insurance. As with all contracts and duties, it is the province of the court to 
decide whether certain undisputed words and actions are sufficient to give rise to a legal 
obligation, including an obligation to procure insurance. Based on the undisputed facts of 
this case, there was insufficient detail, as a matter of law, to trigger a duty or contract to 
procure insurance. Defendants ask that this Court reverse the Court of Appeals' decision, 
and affirm the grant of summary judgment in all respects. 
DATED this P-^day of December, 2002. 
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Attorneys for the Defendants/Appellants 
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